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Abstract 
We apply the theory of inequality in opportunity to measure inequity in mortality. Our empirical work is based on 
a rich dataset for the Netherlands (1998-2007), linking information about mortality, health events and lifestyles. 
We show that distinguishing between different channels via which mortality is affected is necessary to test the 
sensitivity of the results with respect to different normative positions. Moreover, our model allows for a 
comparison of the inequity in simulated counterfactual situations, including an evaluation of policy measures. We 
explicitly make a distinction between inequity in mortality risks and inequity in mortality outcomes. The 
treatment of this difference - “luck” - has a crucial influence on the results. 
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1 Introduction
Economists have always been concerned about the measurement of inequality in outcomes as an
important determinant of overall social welfare. Recently, however, there has been an increased
interest in inequality of opportunity rather than inequality of outcomes. The theoretical funda-
mentals of this approach have been explained in important monographs by Roemer (1998) and
Fleurbaey (2008). The number of empirical applications is growing rapidly — not only in the
domain of income distribution (Roemer et al., 2003; Bourguignon et al., 2007; Devooght, 2008;
Lefranc et al., 2008, 2009; Checchi and Peragine, 2010; Aaberge et al., 2011; Almas et al., 2011),
but also in other domains such as health (Rosa Dias, 2009; Trannoy et al., 2010; Jusot et al.,
2010).
The main intuition of the “inequality of opportunity” approach is that economic agents
should be held responsible for at least part of the observed outcome dierences. Social con-
cern is restricted to inequalities in outcomes that are not the responsibility of the individual.
Where to draw the line between factors for which individuals should be held responsible and
factors for which they should not, is a normative question about which opinions in society dif-
fer. Economists have therefore proposed a unifying formal framework, which can accommodate
dierent philosophical perspectives. Suppose the outcome of interest y is linked to a vector of
explanatory variables z through the function y = Y (z). The first step is to partition the vector
z into variables for which individuals are not held responsible (often called “circumstances” c)
and variables for which they are (often called “eort” e). This partitioning reflects a normative
choice and can be taken as the starting point for the second step: the derivation of inequality
measures which capture the inequality in y in so far (and only in so far) as it is linked to the
c-variables. Of course, the results of this second step will depend on the chosen partitioning,
but the formal approach can be applied to any partitioning. Note that the traditional focus on
pure outcome (e.g. income) inequality is not less normative than the other approaches: it is just
the special case where considerations of individual responsibility are set aside.
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The empirical application of this formal framework raises some dicult issues. First, while
the theoretical rationale for partitioning the vector z is clear, it is often dicult to relate the
specific empirical variables in z to common opinions about justice or to more sophisticated
philosophical theories. Indeed, many variables seem to be of a “mixed” nature, partly reflecting
responsibility and choice, partly reflecting circumstances. Lifestyles are a typical example. Sec-
ond, in real-world applications the available information will always be incomplete. Estimation
of the function Y (z) will therefore yield unexplained variation, a residual, capturing specifica-
tion error, the eect of omitted variables and pure random factors. How to treat this residual?
Roemer (1998, 2002) has put forward an innovative solution to both problems. He proposed
to restrict circumstances to a limited set of variables — and he defines individuals to be of the
same “type” if they are in identical circumstances, defined in this restrictive way. All the other
variables, including the residual, are then interpreted as eort. More specifically, he defines the
level of eort in terms of the percentile occupied by individuals in the outcome distribution of
their “type”. This reflects the normative idea that all variables (whether observed or not) that
are correlated with type should also be interpreted as circumstance. The Roemer-approach gives
coherent theoretical foundations for a pragmatic approach to measuring inequality of opportu-
nity. Yet, the narrow definition of “types” gives only a lower bound for a measure of inequality
of opportunity, which is sometimes hard to interpret. Moreover, the pragmatic stance of Roe-
mer does not take up the challenge of linking the empirical measurement exercise to the rich
philosophical debate on the dierent dimensions of equality of opportunity.
In this paper we explore the potential of a more ambitious approach. First, we claim that
the diculty of partitioning z is linked to the fact that variables exert an influence through
dierent channels, which get mixed up when focusing on the reduced form Y (z). We argue it
is essential to estimate a model that distinguishes between these dierent channels and makes
it possible to assess their relative importance (see also Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009).1 To
1Deaton (2011) writes: “It is possible that an inequality that might seem to be prima facie unjust might
actually be the consequence of a deeper mechanism that is in part benevolent, or that is unjust in a dierent
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this end, we use a recursive modeling strategy that exploits timing between events and exclusion
restrictions. Second, we refrain from the practice of treating the whole residual as “eort”. We
introduce specific measures of eort in our model and interpret the residual in terms of “luck”.
This richer framework allows us to do a sensitivity analysis with respect to dierent normative
views concerning the location of the responsibility cut (Fleurbaey, 2008) and concerning the
treatment of luck (Lefranc et al., 2009; Fleurbaey, 2010).
Our empirical application is to health, and more specifically mortality. Evaluation of in-
equalities in the face of death certainly are one of the most ethically challenging issues. We
exploit rich diagnostic information from hospital admissions and cause of death registries in
the Netherlands to estimate a recursive model. In the health domain it is natural to accept
that “eort” and individual responsibility are linked to the choice of lifestyles. At least since
Grossman (1972), the role of lifestyles has been acknowledged in theoretical models of health
production and there exist good examples of rich models of lifestyle and mortality (e.g. Balia
and Jones, 2008, 2011). The identification of eort variables is more dicult in the case of in-
come distribution, since it is hard to simply interpret eort as the number of hours worked. The
health setting is therefore an interesting one to test the interpretative potential of rich models of
inequality of opportunity (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011). However, while our application is
to health, the methodological questions we address (interpretation of a model that distinguishes
between dierent channels, implementation of dierent philosophical theories, treatment of the
residual) are relevant for all applications of equality of opportunity, also in other domains.
Our model reveals strong educational gradients in healthy lifestyles, and healthy lifestyles
have a protective eect on mortality in the Netherlands. We use our model to illustrate how
dierent normative views influence the measured degree of inequity, and show that the location
of the responsibility cut is of vital importance. We observe, for example, that the traditional
measures of inequity (such as socioeconomic and regional inequalities) only capture part of more
way”. We interpret this quote as an appeal to base equity judgments on the insights of a model that distinguishes
between the dierent channels.
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comprehensive notions of unfairness, and that the usual practice of standardizing for age and
gender can have large eects on measured inequity. We further illustrate that the use of a
flexible empirical approach which accommodates the likely situation where the mortality impact
of “circumstances” depends on “eort” levels, and vice-versa, can dramatically complicate the
measurement of inequity. Fortunately, the proposed unifying formal framework seems to oer
a way out. Finally, we show that the treatment of the residuals is important in this context,
not just from a statistical point of view, but also because it entails normative choices in itself.
We interpret the residuals of our mortality model as “option” luck, the kind of luck that can
be avoided by prudent people if they take precautions, and “brute” luck, the luck that even
reasonable and prudent people remain vulnerable to (Dworkin, 1981). We show that “brute” luck
in mortality completely dominates measured inequity. We also test and reject the assumption
of “even-handedness” of luck invoked by Lefranc et al. (2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our formal frame-
work for measuring inequity. Section 3 describes the data, the econometric model and the
estimation results. Section 4 contains our results concerning inequity in mortality risks, illus-
trates the importance of the location of the responsibility cut and compares our approach with
the Roemer-approach, which does not distinguish between dierent channels through which
mortality is determined. Section 5 discusses the treatment of luck. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Equality of opportunity and fair allocations
We will introduce our basic measurement concepts for the simplest possible deterministic reduced
form and then describe how the approach can be extended to a recursive model with random
variables. The outcome of interest is mortality M that is related to a set of variables z through
the function M(z). To implement the idea of inequality in opportunity2, we partition the vector
z in a subvector of “circumstances” c for which individuals cannot be held responsible (and
that therefore lead to unequal opportunities) and a subvector of “eort” variables e for which
2We will use the terms “inequality in opportunity” and “inequity” interchangeably.
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individuals should be held responsible. The mortality of individual i can then be written as:
Mi =M(ci, ei) (1)
The traditional economic approach, focusing on socioeconomic dierences in mortality (see,
e.g. Attanasio and Emmerson, 2003), implicitly takes socioeconomic status (SES) as the circum-
stance variable — and all other variables as eort. Interpreting lifestyle as the eort variable, and
all other variables as circumstances is another example. These are only two possible approaches,
however, and we will describe a whole range of alternative views on the responsibility cut in
section 4. The formal analysis in this section can be applied to any partition (ci, ei).
Given a partitioning, the question then is how to measure “illegitimate” inequalities of
opportunities, i.e. how to purge a simple inequality measure of the eects for which individuals
should be held responsible. Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) propose two methods. The first
is called “direct unfairness” — it consists of putting the eort variables at reference values and
then measuring inequality in the adjusted advantage measures ai = M(ci, e). It is clear that
inequality in ai can only be due to dierences in ci, since the eort variables are fixed. The
second starts from the definition of what is considered to be an “equitable situation” — in which
all inequalities are linked to eort variables, by putting all circumstance variables at reference
values — and calculates individual “fairness gaps” (fgi) as the dierence between the actual
situation and this equitable point of reference, i.e.
fgi =M(ci, ei)M(c, ei) (2)
Inequity is then defined as inequality in these fairness gaps.
The literature has thus far mainly opted (implicitly or explicitly) to calculate direct un-
fairness. This may indeed seem the most natural of the two approaches. This choice is not
innocuous, however. A natural condition to be imposed on an inequity measure is what Fleur-
baey and Schokkaert (2009) call “compensation”: inequity should only be zero if two individuals
with exactly the same value for the eort (responsibility) variables also have the same mortality.
Only in that case do we fully include in our measure of inequity all eects of dierences in
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circumstances. It is immediately clear that the fairness gap satisfies this condition, while the
measure of direct unfairness does not. Consider two individuals i and j with ei = ej = e. It is
very well possible that M(ci, e) =M(cj , e), while at the same time M(ci, e) =M(cj , e). On the
other hand, fgi = fgj if and only if M(ci, e) =M(cj , e).
The problem with direct unfairness is linked to the existence of what Gravelle (2003) in a
similar setting has called “essential nonlinearities”, i.e. a situation where the value of e influences
the marginal eect of c. More generally, the idea of “essential nonlinearities” also helps to
understand the dierences between the results for direct unfairness and for the fairness gap.
Fixing eort (respectively circumstances) at their reference value in M(ci, e) (resp. M(c, ei)) in
a certain sense “removes” the impact of the values of ei (resp. ci) on the marginal eect of ci
(resp. ei) on mortality. These “essential nonlinearities” will therefore not be taken into account
in the calculation of direct unfairness, which is simply based on M(ci, e). However, they do
reappear in the fairness gap through the observed mortality M(ci, ei). If the marginal eect of
eort on mortality depends positively (negatively) on the value of the circumstances (or vice
versa), we may expect a positive (negative) eect on inequity as measured by the fairness gap. For
example, and anticipating our results in section 3 and 4, we find that mortality is higher among
older individuals and among individuals with low education, but also that the eect of education
is larger for older individuals. Under the ethical stance that takes age as the eort variable and
education as the circumstance variable (commonly known as age-standardisation), the dierence
between direct unfairness and the fairness gap will crucially depend on the magnitude and sign of
the interaction between education and age. Since we find that the combination of low education
and old age reinforces the mortality risk, one would expect larger inequities as measured by
the fairness gap compared to direct unfairness, which is exactly what we find in our empirical
analysis. We will further illustrate in section 4 that these “essential nonlinearities” indeed play
a crucial role.3
3The literature (e.g. Fleurbaey, 2008) shows that dierent approaches to inequality of opportunity not only
dier in their degree of respect for the compensation principle, but also embody dierent ideas about “reward”,
i.e. about what is the optimal distribution in the hypothetical situation where all individuals are of the same
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In many cases it will be dicult to classify a given variable z unambiguously in c or in
e. The problem can be illustrated — and is at the same time partly solved — by the use of a
recursive model that underlies the reduced form M(zi) and that identifies dierent channels
through which variables aect mortality. Let us specify:
Mi = m(Hi, Li, xi) (3)
Hi = h(Li, xi) (4)
Li = l(xi,i) (5)
where M stands for mortality, H for health “events (or shocks)”, L for lifestyles, x is a vector
of exogenous variables that aect lifestyles, health and mortality (such as education or age) and
 a vector of (exogenous) preference shifters (only influencing L). For expositional purposes it
is convenient to summarize eqs. (3)-(5) in the quasi-reduced form
Mi = m [h(l(xi,i), xi), l(xi,i), xi] (6)
which can be compared with the reduced form
Mi =M(xi,i) (7)
Consider now the eect of one specific variable in xi. Take for the sake of illustration age. Eq.
(6) shows that age may influence mortality through three dierent channels: (a) there may be
an eect of age on mortality, conditional on health shocks and lifestyle; (b) age may aect health
shocks (and hence mortality), conditional on lifestyle; (c) age may have an influence on lifestyle.
A priori there is no reason why these eects should have the same ethical status, e.g. people
with lower age could be held responsible for their lifestyle, but not for the eects of age on
health shocks and on mortality. When working with the reduced form these eects cannot be
distinguished. The finer distinctions can be introduced in the quasi-reduced form (6), however.
This seems a decisive advantage. We will show relevant examples in section 4.
type. The reward principles underlying direct unfairness and the fairness gap are discussed in Fleurbaey and
Schokkaert (2011): they are closely related to the principle of liberal reward.
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Let us finally relax the assumption that the model is fully deterministic. Introducing a
stochastic term  in each of the three equations (3)-(5) yields (in obvious notation) the quasi-
reduced form
Mi = m

h(l(xi,i, 
L
i ), xi, 
H
i ), l(xi,i, 
L
i ), xi, 
M
i

. (8)
In any empirical application such as our own, one has to estimate the functions (3)-(5).
One can then obtain estimates for the expected value of mortality E (Mi|xi,i) and apply the
inequity measures to this. This is the most common approach in applied work. It corresponds
to ignoring everything that cannot be explained by the empirical model. If all this could be
considered to be “luck”, then this would mean that this approach simply ignores “luck” in the
measurement of inequity in mortality. We return to this issue below. A second approach is to
focus on actual outcomes after the realization of “luck”. In the context of our empirical model,
this corresponds to considering not only the predicted expected value ofMi but also the residuals
of the model. In this broader approach, these can be classified, just as all other variables, as
either circumstances c or eort e. The measures of direct unfairness and fairness gap can then
applied to this “extended” set of variables. A third approach has been proposed by Lefranc et al.
(2009). They treat “luck” as a separate variable with its own characteristics, which cannot be
reduced to either circumstances or eort. According to them, “luck” does not create any inequity
if it is “even-handed”, i.e. if it hits in the same way individuals which dier in circumstances.
These three approaches have a straightforward interpretation when the residuals of the model
indeed capture “luck”. In practice, however, they will also capture the eects of specification
errors and of omitted variables — some of which may be seen as legitimate, others as illegitimate
sources of inequality. In other words, the residuals capture everything which is not observed
by the social planner (or the analyst). This makes the interpretation more dicult. In section
4, we will follow the common approach, neglect the residuals and focus on expected values. In
section 5 we explore some implications of the other two approaches to the interpretation of luck.
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3 Explaining dierences in mortality: data and model
We will impose the model in eqs. (3)-(5) on data for the Netherlands. In this section, we describe
the data, discuss the empirical modeling strategy and the resulting estimates.
3.1 Description of the data
We use data from a representative sample of non-institutionalized Dutch individuals taken from
the health module of three cross-sectional surveys on living conditions (HSLC hereafter). The
HSLC’s contain information on lifestyles and on the variables x and . They were linked by
Statistics Netherlands to two administrative datasets: the national medical registry (NMR here-
after) and the cause-of-death registry (CD hereafter) which contain, respectively, all hospitaliza-
tions between 1998 and 2005, and all deaths between 1998 and 2007 in the Netherlands. These
linkages provide us with survival information for each individual in the HSLC and with the
opportunity to exploit exceptionally rich and objective diagnostic information linked to each
hospital admission. As far as we know, such information has not been used before to analyze
disease-specific impacts of lifestyles on mortality. Since the linkage between HSLC and NMR
is only available from 1998 onwards and since we want to ensure a suciently long mortality
follow-up, we use the HSLC’s for 1998, 1999 and 2000.4 We dropped individuals younger than
40 when surveyed by HSLC as they represent only about 5% of those who died by 2007.
healthy lifestyles
exogenous variables
preference shifters
new health events mortality
  
t = 1998, 1999, 2000
  
t+ 1 t+ 5
  
t+ 1 t+ 7
Figure 1: Timeline of HSLC and follow-up in NMR and CD
4In addition, a change to the HSLC questionnaire in 2001 renders some variables incomparable before and
after this date.
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We model lifestyles, health events and mortality in three stages in chronological order (see
the timeline in Figure 1). Indicators of lifestyles, exogenous variables, and preference shifters
(respectively, contained in vectors Li, xi and i) are taken from HSLC (t = 1998, 1999 or 2000).
Health events Hi are indicators of whether individuals were hospitalized due to the respective
health event during the following 5 calendar years (t+1 and t+5) but not in t, and are modelled
as functions of lifestyles and exogenous variables at time t. Finally, an indicator of whether the
individual died between t+1 and t+7 is assumed to depend on lifestyles and exogenous variables
at time t and health events from t+1 to t+5. The timespan for health events and mortality was
determined by data availability (as said above, respectively until 2005 and 2007) and, conditional
on this, by our objective to ensure equal time at risk for all individuals (even if for individuals
in HSLC 1998 and 1999 a longer follow up was possible). We have a total number of 12,484
observations. There seems to be sucient variation in mortality, since about 11 percent of the
individuals have died by 2005, 2006 or 2007 (see appendix).
We obtain indicators of the occurrence of new health problems from diagnostic information
(ICD-9-CM codes) in the NMR, and refrain from using existing health events to minimize biases
due to reverse causation. We selected those codes that are likely to correspond to a new health
problem if the individual did not go to the hospital for the same code during the previous year.
This excludes diagnoses for which individuals are usually first treated as outpatients or which
relate to chronic conditions (for example, all mental problems were excluded as these diagnoses
are normally related to chronic conditions and are usually preceded by outpatient visits). We
considered six groups of new adverse health events: the incidence of i) cancer, ii) circulatory
diseases, iii) stroke, iv) respiratory problems, v) digestive problems and vi) genitourinary prob-
lems.5
5We are grateful to Isabelle Soerjomataram for her guidance in the identification of new health events from
NMR data.
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We consider three indicators of healthy lifestyles, whether individual: i) is a nonsmoker, ii)
exercises (at least 1 hour per week) and iii) is not overweight (i.e., if BMI<25).6 Since we have
no information on diet but do control for exercise, the variable “overweight” is intended to proxy
for diet. Our vector of exogenous variables xi is composed of dummy variables representing age-
sex categories, highest level of education achieved, house ownership, marital status and whether
there are children in the household. The preference shifters in vector i are indicators of religion,
region and urbanization (population density) of the area of residence. More information on all
variables used, as well as descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Specification of the model
In this section we explain how we implement empirically the conceptual model in eqs. (3)-(5).
We specify a system of probit equations for mortality Mi, the new health events represented in
vector Hi = [HCAi, HCIi, HSi, HRi, HDi, HGi] (cancer, circulatory diseases, stroke, respiratory,
digestive and genitourinary disease) and indicators of whether the individual does not smoke,
exercises and is not overweight, Li = [LNSi, LEi, LNWi].7 Denote by O the latent variables
underlying each observed variable O, O = M,HCA, HCI , HS , HR, HD, HG, LNS , LE , LNW . The
observed binary outcome Oi = 1 if Oi > 0 and Oi = 0 otherwise.
6While the relation between health onsets, mortality and BMI might be non-linear, we did not include an
indicator for underweight as only a small proportion of the sample reports to be underweight. For similar reasons
we exclude indicators of alcohol consumption.
7While more detailed information is available concerning survival between t and t + 7, the exact timing
of the new health events, and frequency of smoking, exercise and BMI, we opted to restrict our attention to
binary indicators. First, preliminary analysis of our data indicated that these thresholds are the most relevant
for mortality and/or health events. Second, this choice makes the estimation of our econometric model more
tractable (see also Balia and Jones, 2011).
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We specify the following model for the latent variables:
Mi =

h=CA,CI,
S,R,D,G
hHhi +

l=NS,E,NW
lLli + xiM + 
M
i (9)
Hhi =

l=NS,E,NW
hlLli + xi
h + hi , h = CA,CI, S,R,D,G (10)
Lli = xi
l + i
l + li, l = NS,E,NW (11)
where xi and i are as defined above and h, l, M , hl, h, l, l (with l = NS,E,NW , h =
CA,CI, S,R,D,G) are (vectors of) coecients to be estimated. The error terms are assumed
to follow a multivariate normal distribution,

Mi , 
CA
i , 
CI
i , 
S
i , 
R
i , 
D
i , 
G
i , 
NS
i , 
E
i , 
NW
i
 
MVN (0,

) where

is a 10 10 symmetric matrix with all elements in the diagonal equal to
1 and o-diagonal elements equal to the correlations between the corresponding error terms.
As explained above, we observe mortality, health events and lifestyles at dierent periods in
time. In particular, health events are observed one to five years after lifestyles (and exogenous
variables), and mortality one to seven years after the same variables.8 By accounting for timing
in this way, we expect to remove one source of endogeneity, reverse causality, particularly from
the relationship between health events and lifestyles. For example, if we measured exercise and
the onset of a respiratory disease in the same year, then there could be reverse causality due
to some individuals stopping or starting exercising as a consequence of being diagnosed with a
respiratory disease. Our specification is able to test for further correlation across unobservables of
dierent equations (for example, across health equations, due to comorbidities). If unobservables
in the three stages of our model are correlated, then ignoring such correlations by estimating a
series of univariate probit models would lead to inconsistent estimates of the observed eects.
Due to its recursive structure and non-linearity, our model would be identified even without
exclusion restrictions. However, identification of eects of lifestyles on health events and mor-
tality equations is aided through such exclusion restrictions. In particular, preference shifters
i (religion, region and urbanization) only influence lifestyles and not health events (nor mor-
8We do not include time subscripts as we have only one observation per individual.
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tality).9 We are not aware of other studies using religion, region and/or urbanization while
jointly modeling lifestyles, health events, and/or mortality, but there is some indirect evidence
supporting our exclusion restrictions. Religion has regularly featured as a source of exogenous
variation to estimate the impact of lifestyles on economic outcomes (e.g., Auld, 2005), and also
region has been used as an instrument for mortality (Balia and Jones 2008).10
3.3 Estimation results
We estimate the model by maximum simulated likelihood and correct standard errors for clus-
tering at the year and municipality level.11 The null hypothesis that all correlation coecients
equal zero is rejected (p < 0.0001) implying that we cannot resort to a series of univariate probit
models.
Let us first look at the estimated correlations between error terms across equations (Table
1). The estimated correlations between mortality/health equations and lifestyles and between
mortality and health equations are generally small and insignificant, suggesting that relationships
between stages of our model are fully explained by observables. The estimated correlations
9Our data does not include variables that could be used as exclusion restrictions for the health events equation,
i.e. no variable enters the lifestyle and health event equations, but not the mortality equation. More generally
and beyond our data, it seems plausible that few variables might satisfy the necessary conditions in practice.
10While not a formal test of instrument validity, univariate probit models for the mortality equation (9) and
the health event equations (10) with religion, region and urbanization as additional regressors showed no evidence
of joint and/or individual significance. In addition, the Wald-test of joint significance in the lifestyle equations
supports the strength of the instruments (p value < 0.001).
11Maximum simulated likelihood is consistent when the number of observations is large and when there is
a sucient number of draws. In practice, a reasonably small number has been found to result in well-behaved
estimates. The estimates presented in this paper are based on five draws. Five draws lead to an optimization time
of one week and increasing the number further would drastically increase optimization time of our 10-equation
model (Hajivassiliou 1997). Therefore, we tested the sensitivity of our estimates to the number of draws by
experimenting with sub-models of our 10-equation model which take considerably less time to optimize. We
monitored the behavior of the estimates when increasing the number of draws from 5 to 250 and found that our
main results remained qualitatively unchanged.
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between health events are mostly positive, reflecting comorbidities.12 Significant and sizeable
correlations are found especially between the equations of cancer and other health equations. All
correlations between healthy lifestyles are significant. Unobserved factors driving the likelihood
of smoking correlate negatively with those related to overweight, while the correlations are
positive between exercise on the one hand and not smoking and not being overweight on the
other hand.
Table 1: Estimated correlation coecients between equation of multivariate probit model
Dead Cancer Circulat. Stroke Respir. Digest. Genito. Nonsmok. Exerc.
Cancer 0.035
Circulatory 0.077 0.025
Stroke 0.014 0.082 0.050
Respiratory 0.076 0.164 0.052 0.101
Digestive 0.033 0.091 0.053 0.011 0.119
Genitourinary 0.068 0.044 0.128 0.009 0.078 0.118
Nonsmoker 0.012 0.032 0.006 0.003 0.018 0.034 0.011
Exercise 0.000 0.009 0.010 0.035 0.004 0.029 0.028 0.151
Not overweight 0.044 0.020 0.007 0.014 0.022 0.046 0.016 0.137 0.069
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
We now turn to the estimated eects of observed exogenous and endogenous variables. In
order to assess their magnitude, we present average marginal eects on the probability that each
of the outcomes equals 1. For each outcome, we obtain probabilities separately from the respec-
tive equations in the multivariate probit model. This corresponds to neglecting the correlations
between error terms of mortality and each of the health events (lifestyles) and health events
and lifestyles, which were shown above to be generally small and insignificant. Additionally, we
obtain total eects of lifestyles on the probability of dying. These are obtained by: i) comput-
ing, for each individual, the marginal probabilities of having each of the health events, with
and without adopting the respective healthy lifestyle, ii) replacing the actual occurrence of each
health event by these probabilities, i.e., their expected values and iii) computing the resulting
marginal probability of dying. Table 2 presents these average marginal eects, and the second
column presents the total eects of lifestyles on the probability of dying.
12Among those with at least one new health event, only 12.4% experience two or more new health events.
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With respect to the mortality equation, we find a positive and significant impact of the
health events upon mortality, with the exception of genitourinary and circulatory problems.
The highest eect on mortality is that of cancer which increases the probability of dying within
7 years by about 14 percentage points, while digestive problems, stroke and respiratory problems
increase that probability between 7 and 10 percentage points. Surprisingly, we find no eect of
circulatory diseases. Conditional on the observed health events and exogenous variables, we still
find a protective eect of healthy lifestyles for mortality. Not smoking or exercising decreases the
probability of dying by about 3 percentage points, conditional on the health problems considered
here, while the further decrease caused by not being overweight is small and insignificant. The
other exogenous variables have a significant, but smaller protective eect on mortality, with the
exception that elderly (and especially elderly males) have a much higher probability of dying.
The average marginal eects for the health event equations show that lifestyles influence
mortality through prevention of observed health events, namely stroke (not smoking and exer-
cising) and digestive problems (not being overweight and not smoking). Thus overweight aects
mortality only via the onset of health events, while the other lifestyles also have a direct impact
on mortality. We find no eect of lifestyles on the other health events which was unexpected for
circulatory diseases and cancer.13 Contrary to the mortality equation, we find that the exogenous
variables are rather unimportant for the onset of new health events. We find a few significant
eects, but the magnitudes of these eects are small. This means that these variables (for ex-
ample houseownership) mainly matter for the new health events via lifestyles, but that there is
hardly any direct eect. The only exception is age and gender which play a more prominent
role, capturing disease-specific age-gender patterns.
Finally, the exogenous variables are more important in the lifestyle equations, showing for
example a strong educational gradient in healthy lifestyles. Preference variables (religion, region
13We tried to check whether there was a positive eect for lifestyles-related cancers (e.g. a relationship between
smoking and lung cancer). Unfortunately, the number of observations with lifestyle-related cancers was too small
to derive statistically sound conclusions.
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and urbanization) also contribute significantly to the explanation of lifestyle dierences.
3.4 Generalized residuals
For the treatment of “luck” we need to obtain residuals of our estimated multivariate pro-
bit model. In a linear probability model, the residual is easily computed as the dierence
between actual and predicted outcomes. In probit models, generalized residuals have been
proposed that equal the expected value of the error term, conditional on the estimated para-
meters, the explanatory variables, and observed outcome (Gourieroux et al., 1987). We imple-
ment this in our multivariate probit model obtaining, for example for the lifestyle equations:
grli = E

li|Lli = 1;xi,i

=


xi
l+i l


xi
l+i l and grli = E

li|Lli = 0;xi,i

=


xi
l+i l
1

xi
l+i l . In
section 5, we will interpret these generalized residuals as a deterministic value — the “realization
of luck” — in our comparison of dierent ways to handle luck in the measurement of inequality
of opportunity. In the next section, we will neglect them and use simply the estimated expected
value of mortality.
4 Inequity in mortality risks: the importance of the responsi-
bility cut
In this section we focus on inequity in mortality risks. We will (i) show how dierent (c, e)-
partitionings — reflecting dierent normative views — influence the measurement of inequity;
(ii) discuss the results of a set of policy-relevant counterfactual simulations and iii) compare
our results with those of the Roemer-approach, which does not allow for the dierent channels
through which variables might influence mortality.
Using the complete recursive model, we simulate for each individual his/her predicted prob-
ability of dying, conditional on the actual values of all variables. Call this MBi . To measure
“direct unfairness”, we simulate probabilities MS(ci, e) conditional on actual values of circum-
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stance variables and reference values of eort variables. The fairness gap is computed as
fgi =M
B
i MS(c, ei) (12)
where MS(c, ei) is the simulated probability of dying conditional on actual values of eort vari-
ables and reference values of circumstances. All these calculations neglect the actual mortality
experience of individuals and the estimated correlations between the error terms of the multi-
variate probit.
In order to calculate the dierent measures, we have to choose reference values c and e. For
the fairness gap it makes sense to pick as reference values for c the characteristics of the type that
can be assumed to be in the “best” situation, i.e. for which mortality is lowest conditional on
the values of e. This fits in the interpretation of M(c, ei) as an equitable reference point.14 For
consistency, we then make a similar choice for e. The reference values corresponding to the “best”
situation are obtained as the categories for each of the exogenous variables xi and the preference
shifters i that have the lowest probability of dying, conditional on the remaining variables, as
predicted from our multivariate probit model. Hence, we use as reference values: i) those living
in a less densely populated area, ii) in the West of the Netherlands, iii) married individuals, iv)
with children; v) homeowners; vi) those who have completed at least an undergraduate (non-)
university degree, and vii) Presbyterians. Only for the age-gender categories, have we deviated
from this procedure by choosing the youngest females as the reference category, rather than
those between 50 and 60 which have a slightly lower estimated probability of dying.
14 It is also in line with the broader analysis in Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011). They introduce health care
explicitly in the model and show that the choice of c is related to the position taken with respect to vertical equity.
If dierent groups are treated dierently by the health care system, c should refer to the type that receives the
“best” health care.
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4.1 An overview of dierent normative choices
To structure our discussion, we write the quasi-reduced form (6) explicitly in terms of the
variables that have been introduced in the previous section,
Mi = m [h(l(edi, hoi, di, agi, regi, bi), edi, hoi, di, agi), l(edi, hoi, di, agi, regi, bi), edi, hoi, di, agi]
(13)
where edi stands for education, hoi for houseownership, agi for age and gender, di is the vector
of other demographic variables (being married and having children), regi includes region and
urbanization and bi stands for religious beliefs. In the notation used earlier, the preference
shifters are i = (regi, bi). Dierent normative perspectives can now easily be accommodated
within this framework. Table 3 shows dierent partitionings of the variables into legitimate
(eort) and illegitimate (circumstance) sources of inequality.
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Table 3: Partitioning between legitimate and illegitimate variables (eort and circumstances) for dierent
ethical positions
Ethical position Model Legitimate Illegitimate
All Illegitimate Full Age-gender, education,
(ALLILLEG) house ownership, married,
children
Control Full Married, children, religion, Age-gender, education
(CONTROL) region, urbanization,
house ownership
Preference No lifestyles Lifestyles Age-gender, education,
(PREF) equations house ownership, married,
children for health
events and mortality
Authentic preference Full Age-gender, house Education for lifestyles,
(PREFA) ownership, married, health events and mortality;
children for lifestyles age-gender, house ownership,
married, children for health
events and mortality
Standardization Full Age-gender Education, married, children,
(STAND) religion, region, urbanization,
house ownership
Standardization 2 Full Age-gender for health Education, married, children,
(STANDC) events and mortality religion, region, urbanization,
house ownership;
age-gender for lifestyles
SES Inequality Full Age-gender, marital status, Education, house ownership
(SES) children, religion, region,
urbanization
Regional inequality Full Age-gender, education, Region, urbanization
(REG) married, children, religion,
house ownership
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Table 4 shows the corresponding results for inequity with the fairness gap, and Table 5
those with direct unfairness. We have also calculated confidence intervals for dierences in
inequity estimates within and between Tables 4 and 5 using bootstrap methods.15 This statistical
inference shows that dierences in estimates discussed later in this section are relevant from a
statistical point of view. As a measure of inequality we use the variance.16 The evaluation of the
actual situation is in the second column of both tables (“baseline”). The other columns refer to
the results of counterfactual simulations and will be discussed in the next subsection. The last
row in the tables gives the mean predicted probability of dying — this is the average of MBi (i.e.
the first terms in the fairness gap).
Table 4: Inequity in mortality according to dierent ethical positions using the fairness gap
Ethical position Baseline Counterfactual situations
Educ1 Educ2 Exercise Gender
ALLILLEG 0.0239 0.0183 0.0215 0.0167 0.0158
CONTROL 0.0229 0.0174 0.0206 0.0161 0.0149
PREF 0.0239 0.0182 0.0215 0.0168 0.0157
PREFA 0.0239 0.0182 0.0215 0.0167 0.0157
STAND 0.0061 0.0031 0.0047 0.0041 0.0047
STANDC 0.0066 0.0035 0.0052 0.0039 0.0050
SES 0.0020 0.0005 0.0012 0.0011 0.0015
REG <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
M
B
i 0.1039 0.0850 0.0971 0.0814 0.0761
15Results available from the authors.
16Predicted probabilities of dying are bounded by 0 and 1. This boundedness has consequences for the choice
of inequality measure. Erreygers (2009) has proposed the idea that inequality in attainments (here: predicted
probability of dying) should be equal to inequality in shortfalls (here: predicted probability of surviving). This
so-called “complementarity”-property was further explored by Lambert and Zheng (2011), who show that the
variance is the only measure satisfying this requirement that is also subgroup decomposable.
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Table 5: Inequity in mortality according to dierent ethical positions using direct unfairness
Ethical position Baseline Counterfactual situations
Educ1 Educ2 Exercise Gender
ALLILLEG 0.0239 0.0183 0.0215 0.0167 0.0158
CONTROL 0.0102 0.0072 0.0089 0.0064 0.0058
PREF 0.0146 0.0121 0.0131 0.0146 0.0094
PREFA 0.0218 0.0158 0.0192 0.0170 0.0148
STAND 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
STANDC 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
SES <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
REG <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
M
B
i 0.1039 0.0850 0.0971 0.0814 0.0761
A useful benchmark is that of “pure” inequality in mortality risks MBi , which can be
interpreted as the case where all dierences are considered to be illegitimate. In that case
direct unfairness and the fairness gap coincide — see the first row in the tables.17 As soon as
we accept that individuals are held responsible for some variables, inequity (or inequality of
opportunity) does no longer coincide with pure inequality. How to think about this individual
responsibility? Two broad streams can be distinguished in the literature on responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism (Fleurbaey, 2008; and Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011, for a discussion
in the context of health).
The original philosophical inspiration of that literature (Rawls, 1971, Dworkin, 1981) was
that persons as autonomous moral agents should assume responsibility for their goals and their
conception of the good life, i.e. that they should be held responsible for their preferences. This
17 Inequity as measured by the fairness gap and by direct unfairness will only be equal if we use a translation-
invariant measure. This is related to defining the fairness gap as an absolute deviation, and is an additional reason
for our choice of the variance.
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“preference approach” was attacked by authors such as Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), and
Roemer (1998). They claimed that preferences are often the product of social influences, for
which individuals cannot be held responsible, and they advocated the common-sense view that
individuals should be held responsible only for what they have genuinely chosen, as opposed to
what they have inherited from circumstances. This “control” (or choice) approach has dominated
the empirical literature until now, perhaps because it indeed captures common sense. Yet,
it is not so easy to implement as it may seem. Indeed, from a broader ethical perspective,
“genuine control” requires correcting for interindividual dierences in the environment and also
for dierences in the decision-making abilities of the individuals. But this brings us on a slippery
slope: if, as scientists, we reason within a deterministic model, what room is left for control?
Where do we have to stop in our quest for underlying causes that are not under the control of
the individual? Does free choice really exist?18
Although these considerations may look very abstract, they have to be faced when oper-
ationalizing the control-approach. Indeed, for each of the variables in eq. (13), one has to
decide if they are chosen or not. Age and gender certainly are not under individual control,
but what about educational attainment? This is partly a matter of choice, partly a matter of
innate (uncontrolled) capacities. For the purposes of this exercise we assume that educational
attainment is not a matter of choice. All the other variables are seen as under the control of
the individuals.19 This means that the advantage measure for direct unfairness in the control
18For economists working within the paradigm of rational choice, the problem of determining the boundaries of
control is even more dicult. Indeed, in this paradigm individual decisions result from a mechanical optimization
exercise with a given objective (preferences) and a given set of options (determined by the budget set and
possibly additional constraints). All endogenous variables are causally influenced by other variables of the model
and therefore cannot embody free will (Fleurbaey 2008, p. 87).
19We did some sensitivity analysis. Moving religion, region and urbanisation to the category of “non-controlled”
variables hardly changes the results.
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approach becomes
aCONTROLi = m

h(l(edi,ho, d, agi,reg,b), edi,ho, d, agi), l(edi,ho, d, agi,reg,b), edi,ho, d, agi ,
(14)
while the fairness gaps are given by
fgCONTROLi =M
B
i m

h(l( ed, hoi, di,ag, regi, b), ed, hoi, di,ag), l( ed, hoi, di,ag, regi, bi), ed, hoi, di,ag
(15)
The “preference approach” holds individuals responsible for their preferences, i.e., their
conceptions of a good life, even if these preferences are not chosen and are not under their control.
At first sight, this is easier to implement in our setting, as we can simply say that individuals
are responsible for their lifestyle (but obviously not for the additional factors influencing health
shocks or mortality). This therefore gives
aPREFi = m

h(l( ed,ho, d,ag,reg,b), edi, hoi, di, agi), l( ed,ho, d,ag,reg,b), edi, hoi, di, agi
(16)
fgPREFi =M
B
i m

h(l(edi, hoi, di, agi, regi, bi), ed,ho, d,ag), l(edi, hoi, di, agi, regi, bi), ed,ho, d,ag
(17)
Holding individuals fully responsible for their lifestyle is perhaps a bit too easy, however.
First, chosen lifestyles reflect both preferences and environmental factors (e.g. the budget con-
straint). A theoretically more coherent implementation of the “preference”-approach would
therefore be to assume constrained utility maximization, specify a functional form for lifestyle
preferences and identify its parameters through the estimation of the structural model. While
our data did not allow this more ambitious approach20, it still seems worthwhile to correct to
some extent for economic constraints on lifestyle choices. Educational attainment is a good
proxy for these constraints. Second, the philosophical argument for holding individuals respon-
sible for their preferences is that these reflect their authentic views of the good life. Involuntary
20Moreover, specifying a functional form for preferences would necessarily require us to restrict the range of
possible heterogeneity in individual preferences.
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addictions and biased information should in this richer view be corrected for. Again, particu-
larly interesting questions arise with respect to the eect of education — it has been argued by
Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) that, correcting for income, the eect of education on lifestyles
is mainly related to dierences in cognitive abilities. Could we then not draw the conclusion
that these do not reflect dierences in genuine preferences? Here again, we arrive on a slippery
slope: where does correcting revealed preferences lead to unacceptable paternalism? Yet, to
illustrate the implications of both concerns (the economic and the philosophical one), we define
a third ethical position (“authentic preferences”), where the eect of education on lifestyles is
taken to be illegitimate. This obviously yields
aPREFAi = m

h(l(edi,ho, d,ag,reg,b), edi, hoi, di, agi), l(edi,ho, d,ag,reg,b), edi, hoi, di, agi
(18)
fgPREFAi =M
B
i m

h(l( ed, hoi, di, agi, regi, bi), ed,ho, d,ag), l( ed, hoi, di, agi, regi, bi), ed,ho, d,ag
(19)
Note that we need our recursive model to implement the (“authentic”) preference approach, as
we have to distinguish between the role of the variables in the dierent equations of the model.
The results for these dierent approaches are given in the second (“baseline”) column of
Tables 4 and 5. In the case of direct unfairness, the dierences are substantial. Note the much
smaller value for control, and the substantial eect of purging preferences of the eect of ed-
ucation. The dierences are much smaller for the fairness gap. Indeed, holding individuals
responsible for variables under control or for lifestyles hardly decreases this inequity measure,
compared to the case where all variables are illegitimate. The distinction between direct unfair-
ness and the fairness gap turns out to be vital: “essential nonlinearities” are crucially important.
We explained already in section 2 why we should indeed expect a larger value for inequity based
on the fairness gap in the case where the marginal eect of the circumstance/eort variables de-
pend positively on the value of the eort/circumstance variables, i.e. strengthen their respective
eects on mortality.
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The “control” and “preference” approaches have strong philosophical underpinnings. The
economic literature, however, has until now focused on more pragmatic and partial approaches
such as socioeconomic or regional inequalities (Lee 1991, Smith 1999, Wagsta and van Doorslaer
2000, Cutler et al. 2006, Bengtsson and van Poppel, 2011). Moreover, standardization for age
and gender is quite common. This follows from the idea that dierences are only inequitable, if
they are caused by institutions — and that inequalities linked to age and gender reflect irreme-
diable biological dierences (Wagsta and van Doorslaer 2000).
Pure inequality after standardization for age and gender can almost be seen as a second
benchmark of comparison. Direct unfairness then measures the inequality in
aSTANDi = m [h(l(edi, hoi, di,ag, regi, bi), edi, hoi, di,ag), l(edi, hoi, di,ag, regi, bi), edi, hoi, di,ag] ,
(20)
while the fairness gaps are given by
fgSTANDi =M
B
i m

h(l( ed,ho, d, agi,reg,b), ed,ho, d, agi), l( ed,ho, d, agi,reg,b), ed,ho, d, agi
(21)
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that this standardization has a tremendous eect on measured
inequity, which falls considerably — more so for direct unfairness than for the fairness gap, where
it remains substantial (0.0061). Note, however, that the normative status of this standardization
exercise is far from clear. Age and gender are not under the control of the individuals — and
they may influence preferences. The reference to “irremedial” inequality versus that caused by
“institutions” is not very convincing either: surely the eect of age and gender on health is not
invariant over time and space and does depend on policy. Even if one fully accepts the logic of
standardization for health variables, it is much less obvious to also standardize in the lifestyle
equations.21 Our model allows us to refine the approach and include the latter as illegitimate
sources. This then gives
aSTANDCi = m [h(l(edi, hoi, di, agi), edi, hoi, di,ag), l(edi, hoi, di, agi), edi, hoi, di,ag]
21Lifestyle dierences may be important for explaining gender dierences in mortality - see, e.g., Pampel (2003).
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and
fgSTANDCi =M
B
i m

h(l( ed,ho, d,ag,reg,b), ed,ho, d, agi), l( ed,ho, d,ag,reg,b), ed,ho, d, agi .
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show a slight change in inequity compared to the usual age-gender
standardization.
The partial approaches that are prominent in the health economic literature accept that
standardization is desirable and focus on the inequality due to socioeconomic status and region.
It is easy to translate them in our framework. For the former we take c = (ed, ho)22, for the
latter we take c = reg (i.e. region and urbanization). The corresponding expressions for ai
(aSESi and a
REG
i ) and for fgi (fg
SES
i and fg
REG
i ) can easily be derived following the same logic
as before. The resulting measures of inequity turn out to be very small. The dierences with
the control-approach, which gives a much larger inequity-value, are particularly striking. This
is not so surprising for region, as this only has significant eects in the lifestyle equations. It is
less straightforward for socioeconomic status, however, as education plays an important role in
the explanatory model. We come back to the eects of education in the next subsection.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that the decision to classify age and gender either as
legitimate or illegitimate sources of inequality is crucial. This makes sense since age and gen-
der are the most important determinants of mortality (consult the average marginal eects in
Table 2). To see the importance of this eect, we re-evaluated the “preference” and “control”
approaches with age as a legitimate variable.23 We find that inequities become very small for
direct unfairness. The inequities decline but remain much larger than those for socioeconomic
inequality for the fairness gap which is in line with our earlier explanation of “essential nonlin-
earities” implying here that the marginal eect of education is stronger for older individuals.
It is important to emphasize that these findings should not be interpreted as a weakness of
22We treat houseownership as an indicator of wealth, and therefore consider it to be closely linked to socio-
economic status. This choice does not have an essential impact on our results, however. A sensitivity analysis
with socio-economic status only measured by education yields very similar results.
23These results are available from the authors on request.
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our approach. Quite the contrary, there are good reasons for the dierential treatment of age
and gender in the dierent normative approaches, and our findings simply point to the crucial
importance of the decisions taken in this regard.
4.2 Simulating counterfactual situations
Additional insights into the interplay between the dierent causes of inequity can be obtained by
considering the results of some counterfactual simulations. This will also illustrate how dierent
normative perspectives impact on policy conclusions. We consider in that order the eects of
educational policy, of changing lifestyles and of removing gender dierences. Results are shown
in columns 3 to 6 of Tables 4 and 5. Our discussion will focus on the equity eects, but it is
obvious that for a complete evaluation of policy measures their eciency should also be taken
into account. An indication about this is given by the mean predicted probability of dying MBi
in the counterfactual situations, as given in the last row of Tables 4 and 5.
4.2.1 Educational policy and inequity
Educational dierences are one of the driving forces of inequity in health and educational policy
is often seen as an important component of any attempt to improve the health situation of
the population. We therefore simulate two policies. The first (educ1) consists in equalizing
education for all at the highest level. This is not a realistic policy goal, but the results give us
an idea on the upper bound of equity and eciency that can be reached by educational policy.
The second policy (educ2) is perhaps more realistic. It raises the educational attainment of the
lowest educated group to the second lowest education level.24
Policy educ2 has only a small eect on the mean predicted probability of dying; educ1 is
24Our recursive model addresses potential endogeneity in the relationship between health events and lifestyles,
but assumes that education is an exogenous variable. This is sucient to illustrate the usefulness of our approach
to “inequality of opportunity” - that distinguishes between dierent channels - but might be insucient to simulate
counterfactual educational policies when education is an endogenous variable. The findings in this section should
be interpreted with this limitation in mind.
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(not surprisingly) more eective. The equity eects are substantial, both for direct unfairness
and for the fairness gap — and this whatever the ethical stance that is taken. (Of course, one has
to take into account that regional and socioeconomic inequity was already small in the actual
situation and therefore cannot improve much in absolute terms). This result throws a new light
on the results concerning socioeconomic inequality (where SES is operationalized by education
and house ownership) in the previous subsection. It would be very misleading to conclude from
the latter results that education is after all not so important from the point of view of equality
of opportunity. Quite the contrary, the counterfactual simulations show that education is an
important driving force of inequity in the face of death. The reason again has to be found in the
“essential nonlinearities”: changing the education level influences the eects of other important
variables, such as age and gender.
It is interesting to compare the results for PREF and for PREFA. Remember that in the
partitioning PREF, lifestyle dierences are considered to lead to legitimate inequalities, even
if they are explained by educational dierences. With the partitioning PREFA this is not the
case. One would expect that equalizing education has a much stronger eect on inequity in the
latter case. This is exactly what is found with direct unfairness. It is not true for the fairness
gap, however. As mentioned before, this is because the fairness gap includes all indirect eects
of circumstances in the measure of inequity.
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4.2.2 Changing lifestyles25
Suppose now that society succeeds in letting all individuals exercise at least one hour a week. The
results are given in column 5 (‘exercise’). This change has a surprisingly large eect on average
probabilities of dying, even larger than the ambitious educ1-policy in which all individuals are
assigned the highest possible educational level.
The equity eects of this policy are interesting, because responsibility for lifestyles was
one of the main factors dierentiating the “preference” from the “control” approach. This has
strong eects in the case of direct unfairness. If we hold people fully responsible for their level
of exercise (in approach PREF) inequity is not aected by this policy — for obvious reasons. In
the base situation direct unfairness is calculated as the variance in MS(ci, e) - where e = e, the
“best” possible lifestyle. The policy ‘exercise’ simulates the predicted probabilities for ei = e.
In the control approach, however, equalizing the level of exercise has a large eect on measured
inequity, as we assume that many of the factors influencing the level of exercise are beyond
individual control. Note, however, that there is also a strong eect in the case of PREFA: in this
approach we do not hold individuals responsible for dierences in exercise that are explained by
dierences in educational level. This leads to a larger perceived inequity in the base situation,
but this dierence between PREF and PREFA becomes smaller if exercise is equalized.
Changing lifestyles has also a strong eect in the fairness gap approach, but here the eects
are surprisingly similar for the various ethical positions — for the reasons explained earlier, this
is most surprising for PREF. Again, the explanation lies in the importance of the “essential
nonlinearities”.
25We did several other lifestyle simulations, but do not show the results because they had similar (and somewhat
smaller) eciency and equity impacts. These simulations include situations: i) in which there are no smokers; ii)
where overweight is eradicated; iii) where smoking behavior and overweight of the late 1980s would apply (which
was obtained by running the same lifestyle equations on HSLC’s for the late eighties - the full model cannot be
estimated as the link with NMR and CD is only available since 1998). In addition, we have also simulated the case
where regional dierences and dierences in urbanisation are removed. All results of these additional simulations
are obtainable from the authors upon request.
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4.2.3 Removing gender dierences
Let us finally consider a simulation in which we remove the gender gap, i.e. we equalize the
lifestyles, the occurrence of health shocks and the direct eect on mortality for men and women
(column 6 — ‘gender’). This is not a realistic short run policy, but there are indications in the
literature that the gender gap is recently becoming smaller — and that gender dierences are (at
least to some extent) influenced by social factors (Rogers et al., 2011, Quah, 2011). Surely the
dierent treatment of men and women in society will have an impact on the gender gap. The
counterfactual where the gender gap disappears may be illustrative for the potential importance
of this eect, or, at least, gives an idea about its upper bound.
Of all policy simulations, removing gender dierences has the strongest eect on the average
probability of dying. It also has a strong eect on equity (both for the case of the fairness gap
and direct unfairness) for all the ethical approaches that do not hold individuals “responsible”
for their gender — i.e. for the “philosophically inspired” preference and control-approaches. As
soon as one accepts the need for standardization, however, the eect on inequity is much smaller
(see the results for STAND). Since we know that gender dierences are not fully biologically
determined, there seems to be a real issue here. The common practice of quasi-automatic
demographic standardization may yield a biased picture of inequity.
4.3 The Roemer-approach
The previous sections have illustrated the advantages of working with the full model. It allows to
dierentiate the channels through which variables impact mortality. Moreover it can be used to
gain additional insights by running counterfactual simulations. At the same time it requires a lot
of information, however, which is not always available. It is therefore interesting to compare our
approach with the more popular, pragmatic approach proposed by Roemer (1998). As described
before, it consists in defining “types” as individuals with the same values for the circumstance
variables and then focusing on the outcomes of these types. Eort variables are deliberately not
included, since individuals are seen as exerting the same eort when they lie at the same rank
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in the distribution of mortality for their circumstance type. The entire residual is assumed to
capture eort.26 All variables which are correlated with circumstances are interpreted as being
part of circumstances, as they are not freely chosen by the individuals.
We compare this method with our control-approach in which ci = (agi, edi). In its most
basic version (see e.g. Rosa Dias 2009), the Roemer-method is empirically implemented by
regressing mortality upon the type characteristics, i.e. estimating Mi = m(agi, edi), without
including any other explanatory variables. This is a deliberately misspecified model. The “mis-
specification” is justified as a way to take up the eect of eort variables that are correlated
with circumstances in the estimated coecients of the circumstance variables. One then com-
putes direct unfairness as inequality in the simulated values of m(agi, edi), again omitting the
stochastic part.
We have implemented this approach upon our data by estimating a single “reduced” probit
equation for mortality with age-gender and education as the only explanatory variables. The
misspecification of the model changes the coecient estimates drastically (see average marginal
eects in the appendix). This leads to a direct unfairness estimate of 0.0228, much larger than
the estimate of 0.0102 for direct unfairness within the control approach based on our recursive
model.27 Given the results described before, it is not surprising that integrating the correlation
between legitimate and illegitimate variables into the measure of inequity leads to a higher value
for the inequity measure. In fact, the Roemer-approach gives a value which is very close to our
results with the fairness gap. In this sense, it seems to be a useful approximation in the case
where eort variables are not available.
The Roemer-approach raises some normative issues, however. By construction it picks up in
the circumstances all correlations with eort variables. This makes it impossible to accommodate
normative positions where this correlation does not necessarily lead to illegitimate inequity. The
26This is not relevant for the comparison in this section, since we focus on (ex ante) mortality risks. We come
back to the treatment of the residuals in the following section.
27We also compared the cases where home ownership is included (and age-gender excluded) in the set of
illegitimate variables. The results confirmed the findings in the text.
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most prominent example is the preference approach: obviously preferences can be correlated with
circumstances (e.g. with socioeconomic status), but this would not mean that individuals should
not be held responsible for them (or, formulated dierently, one can still argue that preferences
should be respected, whatever their origin). If one wants to implement such normative positions,
in which some sources of correlation matter to define inequality of opportunity while others do
not, the pragmatic solution of Roemer will not be sucient and one cannot do without the
estimation of a more refined model.
5 Luck and responsibility
Until now, we focused on the predicted probabilities of dying — and not on whether the indi-
vidual actually dies or not. This essentially means that we made two normative choices. First,
predictions of these probabilities are subject to error, since the model does not perfectly capture
reality. We have ignored this in the evaluation of inequity. Second, we assumed that there is no
inequity if predicted probabilities of dying are equal for all individuals with the same observed
“eort”. Of course, in reality some will die and others will not. One could argue that not the ex
ante probabilities but the final outcomes ex post should ultimately matter for social evaluation.
This reflects the classical divide in social choice under uncertainty between the ex ante approach
that applies a standard social welfare criterion to individual expected utilities and the ex post
approach that looks at the possible final distributions of welfare (Fleurbaey, 2010).28
Neither of these options is obvious. The residuals partly take up the eect of omitted
variables. In so far as these are considered to be “illegitimate” sources of inequality, neglecting
them by focusing on predicted probabilities will tend to lead to an underestimation of overall
inequity. Second, it is not obvious that “luck” can be neglected. In this respect, Dworkin (1981)
drew the distinction between “option luck”, the kind of luck that can be avoided by prudent
28We have refrained from using the ex ante-ex post terminology in this paper, as it is also used in the literature
on inequality of opportunity with a dierent (but related) meaning, in which “ex post” basically refers to the
compensation criterion introduced in section 2 (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2009).
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people if they take precautions, and “brute luck”, the luck that even reasonable and prudent
people remain vulnerable to. In his view, individuals can be held responsible for their option
luck, but not for their brute luck. Although this distinction is not beyond criticism (see, e.g.,
Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011, for a brief sketch of the discussion) it is nevertheless a useful
reference point for the discussion. While it might be possible to defend that the stochastic
factors in the lifestyle equation reflect option luck, it is very hard to argue that there is no
brute luck involved in health shocks (such as getting cancer or a stroke) or in unexpected death.
Surely, people cannot be held responsible for this brute luck?
Let us try to gather some additional insights from our model. By way of introduction,
note that the variance of predicted probabilities MBi is 0.0239 — while the variance of observed
mortality is 0.0980. Not surprisingly, the residual is far from negligible. To proceed, we will
refer to this unexplained part as “luck” — and subsume the eects of omitted variables and
specification errors also under this denominator. This is a pragmatic stance. It can also be
given some theoretical underpinning, however. In a deterministic view of the world, “pure”
luck does not exist as all events can (ex post) be linked to some causal factors. Luck is then
everything which could not be predicted (ex ante) on the basis of the available information. In
this view of the world, therefore, the eects of unobserved and therefore omitted variables can
be seen as luck.
We noted already that there are two possible approaches to incorporating luck in the mea-
surement of inequality of opportunity. The first is to treat the residuals just like all other
variables. In our empirical application we calculate for each individual observation and each
equation of the multivariate probit the generalized residuals gri and we classify them either as
circumstances or as eort. This classification will again depend on the normative position that
is taken. We argued already that it is natural to interpret the stochastic factors in the lifestyle
equations as option luck (and hence akin to eort for which individuals can be held responsible)
but those in the mortality and health shock equations as brute luck (and therefore as part of cir-
cumstances). We will implement this assumption in our “control” and “preference” approaches.
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In the STAND (standardization for age and sex) scenario we classify all the generalized residuals
as circumstances. Of course, in the restricted ethical stances focusing on “socioeconomic status”
or on “region”, all other factors, including luck, are seen as legitimate causes of inequality, i.e.
as eort.29
We calculate inequity as direct unfairness and as the fairness gap in predicted outcomes
for the dierent ethical approaches. This focus on predicted outcomes is natural as introducing
luck (and hence removing uncertainty due to luck) should make one consider outcomes rather
than probabilities. It is also consistent with our statistical model. The reference values for the
generalized residuals are chosen to be equal to zero which corresponds to a situation with absence
of luck.30 The results are shown in Table 6.31 They are not surprising, but still very striking.
Somewhat provocatively stated, considering brute luck as circumstance or eort completely
dominates the results and swamps the findings with respect to inequity in mortality risks.
Table 6: Inequity in mortality outcomes for various ethical positions, considering luck as circumstance
Ethical position Direct unfairness Fairness gap
CONTROL 0.0980 0.0980
PREF 0.0980 0.0980
STAND 0.0881 0.0980
SES <0.0001 <0.0001
REG <0.0001 <0.0001
29To avoid an overload of results, we only present results for the basic scenarios “preference” and “standardisa-
tion for age and sex” and not for the alternative versions “authentic preferences” and “alternative standardisation”.
30The predicted outcomes for direct unfairness and the fairness gap are obtained as follows: we predict that
someone dies Mi = 1 when the sum of the linear index and the generalised residual in eq. (9) is larger than zero,
i.e.
hHhi+ lLli+ xiM +grMi > 0, and we predict Mi = 0 otherwise. Note that in order to predict Mi,
we also need to predict in a similar way (including the generalized residuals) whether someone experiences a new
health event (Hhi) and/or whether someone adopts a healthy lifestyle (Lli) using eqs. (10)-(11). Obviously the
subdivision of the explanatory variables and the generalized residuals in circumstance and eort is maintained
while recursively predicting outcomes for both direct unfairness and the fairness gap.
31 In case of predicted outcomes - which are binary variables - the variance delivers the same information as the
mean. We stick to the variance for consistency with the earlier sections that are based on predicted probabilities.
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An alternative approach to luck and equality of opportunity is proposed by Lefranc et al.
(2009). They do not classify luck as either circumstances and eort, but put it in a third box.
Loosely speaking, they claim that in an equitable situation luck should be “even-handed”, i.e.
the distribution of luck should not dier significantly across groups of individuals with dierent
values for the circumstance variables. Indeed, under this condition, the dierent types will be
“hit” by brute luck to the same extent. In our empirical example, we assume that we do observe
eort and hence luck; and therefore we can test directly the even-handedness of the generalized
residuals for mortality.32 We do this in two ways. First, we test whether the distribution of
luck is similar across groups of individuals with identical circumstances, conditional on their
eort. Second, we test whether the distribution of luck is similar across groups of individuals
with identical circumstances without controlling for dierences in eort. The first approach is
the one advocated by Lefranc et al. (2009) and has the implied ethical value judgment that luck
is allowed to be correlated with eort, insofar as luck remains uncorrelated to circumstances.
The second approach requires that the distribution of luck is the same for dierent types, even
if these types have dierent eort levels.
For the empirical application we focus on the control-approach but we simplify the age
and the education variables so that we obtain eight types as the possible combinations of three
binary variables: male/female, young/old (+ 60), high/low (less than secondary) education. We
apply both tests of “even-handedness” to the generalized residuals of the mortality equation in
order i) to keep the analysis as simple as possible and ii) to stick as close as possible to the
concept of ’brute luck’. For the first method we give the results for “all lifestyles healthy” and
for “all lifestyles unhealthy”, for the second method we simply pool all the observations for
each type. Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of the distributions of generalized
residuals between each pair of types decisively reject the null in all cases (results not shown,
32Lefranc et al. (2009) also consider the specific (Roemer) case in which only circumstance variables are observed
(and eort variables and luck are not) and they focus on that case in their empirical application. However, if
one accepts that eort is observable — as we do — their suggestion that luck should be even-handed can be tested
directly.
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available from the authors). By way of illustration we show some kernel density plots in Figures 2
and 3: Figure 2 compares the results for old males with either high or low education (conditional
on eort). Figure 3 shows the kernel density plots for old males and females with either high or
low education.
The results of the tests are clear: luck is not distributed in an even-handed way over the
types. Focusing on actual outcomes rather than on mortality risks therefore adds an addi-
tional dimension of inequity. For our specific empirical issue (inequity in the face of death) the
treatment of the residuals is of essential importance.
Figure 2: Distributions of luck for old males with low and high
education (conditional on eort)
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Figure 3: Distributions of luck for old males and females with
low and high education
6 Conclusion
In this paper we focused on inequity in mortality. We estimated - on a rich dataset - a model
that identifies dierent channels through which variables aect mortality. We have used this
model to implement dierent approaches and measures from the theory of inequality of oppor-
tunity. Rather than summarizing the findings of our empirical work, we draw attention to some
methodological issues that point to useful directions for future research and that go beyond the
specific issue of inequity in mortality.
(a) The traditional measures of inequity that are most popular among economists (such as
socioeconomic or regional inequalities) should not be interpreted as measuring a comprehensive
notion of unfairness. They only capture a part of inequality in opportunity. The recent theories of
equality of opportunity have introduced a formal framework which can be used to accommodate
richer normative views. This makes it possible to link the empirical literature more closely
to the cut between legitimate and illegitimate sources of inequity that has been suggested by
dierent philosophical theories. The flexible nature of the recent economic approach of equality
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of opportunity allows for meaningful sensitivity analyses to compare the implications of these
dierent normative perspectives.
(b) The pragmatic approach proposed by Roemer (1998) is very useful in many cases,
but is not suciently flexible to integrate relevant approaches such as, e.g., the preference
approach to inequality of opportunity. If the available data are suciently rich, it is worthwhile
to go beyond the estimation of a reduced form. The latter is needed to dierentiate between
dierent normative approaches, since the same reduced form variable may work through dierent
channels that have dierent normative implications. Moreover, nonlinearities in the model may
be essential. The dierence between direct unfairness and the fairness gap is therefore of crucial
importance.
(c) Counterfactual simulations are useful to get a better insight into the relative importance
of dierent explanatory factors. Moreover, they show how the evaluation of the equity of policy
measures does depend on the normative position that is taken.
(d) Care is needed in the treatment of unexplained variation. The common approach to
simply disregard it may lead to misleading conclusions, unless one is willing to take the extreme
normative position that ex ante risks are all that matters and that actual outcomes are no cause
of additional social concern. In the face of death, brute luck seems to swamp all other factors,
but it is to be expected that luck also plays an essential role in other contexts. More work is
needed to better understand the implications of dierent approaches to luck, e.g. concerning
the question whether luck is just a variable as all the others (and should be classified as either
circumstance or eort) or whether, on the contrary, it should be put in a dierent box. In
empirical applications, at the very least, a sensitivity analysis with respect to the dierent
approaches is useful — or even necessary.
(e) The usual practice of standardizing for age and gender in health economic applications
should be reconsidered. It has a tremendous eect on measured inequity. In so far as demo-
graphic (mainly gender) dierences are codetermined by social and behavioral factors and are
not only linked to biological dierences, they should be considered explicitly in any analysis of
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inequality of opportunity.
(f) It should be the ambition to collect better data for estimating richer structural models.
Our recursive model is a first step in the direction of a full structural model, but when one
accepts the preference approach to inequality of opportunity, the aim should be to identify the
preference parameters from a full-fledged model of utility maximization.
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Appendix
Description of the data
Table 7: Variable description
Variable Mean
Endogenous variables
Died between t+1 and t+7 0.110
Health problems diagnosed between t+1 and t+5
Cancer 0.055
Circulatory disease 0.044
Stroke 0.023
Respiratory disease 0.013
Digestive disease 0.011
Genitourinary disease 0.010
Healthy lifestyles
Not overweight (BMI<25) 0.483
Nonsmoker currently 0.705
Exercise (more than 1 hour a week) 0.456
Exogenous variables
Age-gender
Male between 40 and 50 0.160
Female between 40 and 50 (reference category) 0.179
Male between 50 and 60 0.137
Female between 50 and 60 0.142
Male between 60 and 70 0.098
Female between 60 and 70 0.099
Male between 70 and 80 0.063
Female between 70 and 80 0.072
Male 80+ 0.019
Female 80+ 0.030
Married 0.751
Has children 0.251
Highest degree of education attained
Primary education (reference category) 0.256
Lower vocational education 0.196
Lower general or scientific secondary education 0.090
Higher vocational, general or scientific secondary education 0.271
Higher vocational education or a university degree 0.188
House owner 0.631
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Table 7: (continued)
Variable Mean
Preference shifters
Religion
Catholic 0.359
Protestant - Dutch reformed 0.174
Protestant - Presbyterian 0.074
Other protestant (reference category) 0.327
Muslim 0.009
Other religion, or not religious 0.057
Region
North 0.120
East 0.231
West (reference category) 0.404
South 0.245
Urbanization
Very low population density (reference category) 0.178
Low population density 0.240
Average population density 0.221
High population density 0.242
Very high population density 0.120
The 6 groups of adverse health events were obtained as follows. First, we aggregated all
diagnoses that could indicate new adverse health events in the following groups: i) infectious
(infectious and parasitic diseases — some codes within 001-139); ii) cancer (neoplasms — some
codes within 140-239); iii) endocrine (endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and immu-
nity disorders — some codes within 240-279); iv) nervous ( diseases of the nervous system and
sense organs — some codes within 320-389); v) circulatory (some codes within 390-422 within
diseases of the circulatory system); vi) stroke (some codes within 430-459 within diseases of
the circulatory system); vii) respiratory (diseases of the respiratory system — some codes within
460-519); viii) digestive (diseases of the digestive system — some codes within 520-579); ix) gen-
itourinary (diseases of the genitourinary system — some codes within 580-629); x) skin (diseases
of the skin and subcutaneous tissue — some codes within 680-709); xi) musculoskeletal (diseases
of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue — some codes within 710-739); xii) injury
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(injury and poisoning — some codes within 800-999). Second, we estimated a univariate mortal-
ity model and excluded those groups showing no evidence of influence, i.e. groups iii), iv), x)
and xii). Third, we removed all groups with an incidence below 1%, i.e. groups i) and xi) to
avoid too small cell sizes. More information can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Some results Roemer model
Table 8: Marginal eects in the "reduced" Roemer model
Inequity 0.023
Marginal eects
Male between 40 and 50 0.000
Male between 50 and 60 0.039
Female between 50 and 60 0.006
Male between 60 and 70 0.130
Female between 60 and 70 0.047
Male between 70 and 80 0.346
Female between 70 and 80 0.181
Male 80+ 0.499
Female 80+ 0.653
Lower vocational -0.025
Low general -0.035
Higher secondary -0.033
Higher education -0.048
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